

A cryptographic authentication technique

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Abstract— In this article, we propose a user cardbased authentication technology to improve the authentication process in systems that allow users to access remotely and increase the security rate when exchanging messages. In this technology, the server performs two functions. The first function is to register a user and give him a user ID and PIN. The user's private card contains confidential information, which is used to perform RC4 symmetric encryption on user messages. Encryption. pr and asymmetric use RSA encryption, the second function, if the user needs, distribute the user's public card, in which the user sends his identity verification code with his own user's name and the recipient's user name to the authentication check, and then the server sends the user's public card is sent to the receiving user, and the sending user can send the message to the receiving user without returning to the server again. We achieve confidentiality through the use of RC4-Pr and RSA encryption and message authentication, user signatures and the use of RSA encryption. In this article, we have also implemented [1] the proposal in the RC4-pr algorithm, which has been modified to improve the key weakness of the basic RC4.

Keywords—. Authentication, Symmetric, Asymmetric, Cryptography, Networks attacks, Authentication cards, public key, Private key, Secret key.

1. Introduction:

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The world's technology has developed rapidly, it has become dependent on open network systems, so the information transmitted between network users has become faster, so we must use many different technologies, such as authentication factors and cryptography, through security The network channel to protect the transmitted data. Used to authenticate users and protect data transmitted through online channels.

A. Cryptography overview:

In an open network system, the information sent and received becomes more susceptible to attacks from unauthorized parties. Through various levels of communication, data encryption becomes the most effective method to counter attacks [1,2,3,4].

The data encryption methods used in this field are divided into:

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1. Symmetric data encryption relies on a single encryption key for encryption and decryption.

2. Asymmetric data encryption using public and private keys.

Public key encryption is about 1000 times slower than private key encryption, so symmetric encryption is still relied on to encrypt all types of data.

There are five elements in a symmetric encryption scheme:

1. Plain text: Putting ordinary messages or data into an encryption algorithm to encrypt them.

2. Encryption algorithm: It is a mechanism to convert plaintext into an incomprehensible format, depending on the key used to perform the operation.

3. Secret key: It is data of a specific length that enters the encryption algorithm together with the plaintext for encryption. The secret key has nothing to do with the plaintext, and the secret key has nothing to do with the plaintext.

4. Ciphertext: It is an encrypted message in an incomprehensible format. It is the output of an encryption algorithm. After performing some transformations and substitutions on the plaintext, it depends on the key.

5. Decryption Algorithm is the reverse process of the encryption algorithm. The conversion of ciphertext into plaintext depends on the key, because the understood format can be clearly read by the receiver [5].

1. *RC4 CIPHER ALGORITHM* (*STREAMS CIPHER*): RC4 is the abbreviation of the RIVEST Cipher 4 algorithm. It is considered a symmetric cipher derived from RSA Data Corporation. The RC4 algorithm works by combining the plaintext and the key stream twice in

combining the plaintext and the key stream twice in the encryption and decryption process. Every encrypted and decrypted message. Generally, symmetric cryptography uses a key for encryption and decryption, in which the sender and receiver exchange keys securely, and the keys must be kept secret. Symmetric cipher systems have two types of encryption block and stream cipher. RC4 is a stream cipher, which performs bit-by-bit or byte-by-byte stream encryption and decryption, but in the block, the cipher splits the plaintext into fixed-size blocks, where the block-by-block encryption is performed. And decrypt [6,7,8,9,10,11]. Algorithm alienation into two parts (KSA - Key Scheduling Algorithm and PRGA - Pseudo-Random Generation Algorithm).

The initial stage is KSA, where the key K is used to replace the N-bit state table S. KSA pseudo code can be implemented.

In the aforementioned process, the bit positions in the state table S are swapped, and then used as the input value of PRGA, and pseudo-random permutation is used to generate a stream of pseudo-random values. PRGA's pseudo code can also be implemented [12,13,14,15].



Figure 1 Functional steps in RC4

On the sender side, the output stream Z is XORed with the input stream to obtain the ciphertext, as shown in the following equation:

$$C = \hat{M} \mathbf{XOR} Z$$

M: input message with N bits.

At the receiving end, the output stream Z is XORed with the ciphertext to obtain the plaintext.

 $M = C \mathbf{XOR} Z$

RC4 has several recognizable softness. KSA is a very well-known softness of RC4, which makes the state table arranged by weak keys insecure. In order to strengthen KSA, the proposed work introduces a novel method that can generate KSA state tables in different mechanisms [16,17,18,19,20,21].

FOR i = 0 TO 255

S[i] = i

 $j=(j + S[i] + K[i]) \mod N$

Swap(S[i] ,S[j])

NEXT

Figure 2 Key Scheduling Algorithm (KSA).

i,j = 0

while (true)

i=(i+1) mod N

j=(j+S[i]) mod N

Swap(S[i] , S[j])

Z=S[S[i]+S[j]] mod N]

Figure 3. Pseudo-Random Generation Algorithm (PRGA).

PREVIOUS ATTACKS ON RC4:

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Due to the huge effective key of RC4, it seems impossible to attack PRGA (this part of the most famous attack takes more than 2700 time). The only actual result related to PRGA concerns the construction of the specifier. Fluhrer and McGrew described in [FM00] how to distinguish between RC4 output and a random string with 230 data. Mantin and Shamir described in [MS01] a better discriminator that requires 28 data. However, this discriminator can only be used to partially attack RC4 in broadcast applications. The fact that the initialization of RC4 is very simple has inspired a lot of research on this mechanism of RC4. In particular, Roos found in [Roo95] a type of weak key that reduces its effective size by 5 bits, while Grosul and Wallach showed in [GW00] that RC4 is vulnerable to large keys with a size close to N words. Related key attack [22,23,24,25,26].

2. RSA CIPHER ALGORITHM (Public keyencryption):

The RSA algorithm is one of the most widely accepted and implemented algorithms. It was developed by Ron Rivest, Uday Shamir, and Lyn Adelman of the Massachusetts Institute of Technology in 1977 and first released in 1978. The RSA algorithm consists of two keys, a public key and a private key. The private key is used for decryption. To encrypt through the RSA algorithm, we must first generate a public key and a private key for it, through the following steps [32]:

- 1- Select two prime numbers p, q
- 2- Compute n=p*q
- 3- Compute $\emptyset(\mathbf{n})=(\mathbf{p-1})(\mathbf{q-1})$; where $\emptyset(\mathbf{n})$ is Euler's totient function.
- 4- Choose e, so that $1 < e < \emptyset(n)$, and $gcd(e, \emptyset(n))=1$
- 5- Determine the Public Key (e,n)
- 6- To determine the **Private Key** (**d**,**n**) must calculate d
 - , where $d = e^{-1} \mod \mathcal{O}(n)$

Figure 4 Generate keys in RSA algorithm After completing the key generation, encrypt and decrypt with the following equation:

To encrypt we use the equation:

 $C = m^e \mod n$

And for decrypt, we use the equation:

 $\mathbf{M} = \mathbf{c}^{\mathbf{d}} \bmod \mathbf{n}$

The asymmetric encryption algorithm overcomes the key distribution problem. The strength of the RSA algorithm depends on the key length and the parameter value n, so it is considered safe when there is a large random value (p, q). But the problem with this algorithm is that the processing speed required for complex arithmetic operations, large key generation, and large text encryption takes a long time to achieve.

2

[33].

The nature of the RSA algorithm makes it impossible to encrypt a large amount of data. It is sufficient for limited data [34]. Through the experimental analysis of the algorithm performance by the researchers, they concluded that the RSA algorithm requires more processing time and use. More memory [35].

Therefore, they are used to encrypt symmetric keys for secure transmission.

According to many studies, the RSA algorithm is one of the most secure algorithms that has not yet been cracked, because only authorized persons can decrypt with the private key, and the private key is kept secret from its owner [33][36][37].

In order to take advantage of the characteristics of the previous RSA algorithm and reduce its difficulty, many researchers combine symmetric encryption algorithms with RSA algorithms to achieve better results in terms of security and encryption time. For example, the RSA algorithm is used to encrypt data of different sizes. Note that the larger the amount of data, the longer the encryption time. The RC5 algorithm is used to encrypt the data, and the RSA algorithm only encrypts RC5 confidential information [38].

In addition, the researchers proposed a method based on a very good privacy policy method (Bigcrypt), which uses a hybrid encryption between RSA and AES to encrypt big data, and then tested the model on three different platforms to obtain High security and overcome the difficulty of encrypting big data. RSA data [34].

B. Networks Attacks:

There are many types of network attacks, of which camouflage attacks are the most. Such attacks may be passive attacks (such as eavesdropping attacks) or active attacks (such as replay, interception, interruption, or modification attacks) to cause data loss. Through these attacks, as a result, it suffers from the security triangle represented by confidentiality, integrity and information availability (CIA). The following shows a major attack on the network:

1. Masquerade Attack:

The Masquerade attack is called Impersonation attack and relies on logging in to the IoT network through a leaked identifier to execute the attack, making the network vulnerable. The attacker uses a stolen username and password and uses a fake identity to authorize himself as Ordinary users, so the adversary becomes the authorized party in the network, and this crime depends on the level of identity verification in the network. If the criminal has full authorization, it will be catastrophic, which will lead to opportunities for cybercrime.

In this case, the organization must review the security of identity verification and authorization in its network to protect itself from any future impersonation attacks. [27].

	Masquerade Attacks	Description
	Impersonation	The attacker successfully to
		suppose the identity of the
		legitimate user.
	Anonymity	The attacker hides their identity and performs attacks anonymously.
		The attacker steals user
	User Tracing	information by track user
		footsteps.
		The attacker creates an
	Cloning	instance of the legitimate
		user.
		The attacker steals the
	Identity Theft	identification of the genuine
		user and performs malicious
		tasks.
		The attacker is an authorized
	Insider	party that performs malicious
		tasks inside the network.
		The intruder in this attack
		steals verification data of
	Stolen Verifier	current or past the
		authentication session from
		the server side and tries to get
		the server by using
		compromised data.

Activity	The attacker monitors the	
Tracking	activity of legal users.	
	the attacker captures a packet	
Dry Dogging	from the user and responds to	
By-Passing	the user as a genuine	
	receiving node.	

Table 1 Description of different types of masquerade attacks:

2. Man-in-the-middle Attack:

The attacker secretly relays and may change the communication between the two parties who think they are directly communicating with each other. This form of eavesdropping is that the eavesdropper controls all the content sent to the other party, which can steal valuable data such as credit card numbers. Otherwise, The following figure shows how the eavesdropper performs this operation: [28,29].



Figure 5 Man-in-the-middle Attack

The type of MITM attack is ARP poison attack. The attacker sends a forged ARP to change the given MAC address that maps the IP to the network resource. It is only mapped once and the cache is modified. In fact, the MAC address has not changed. The attacker can act as two domains. The middleman between the two hosts, controls the broadcast between the two hosts [29].

3. Forging Attack:

In this attack, the other party stole the authentication information, and he obtained the authentication of a real user, but he did not. There are many forgery attacks, such as gateway forgery, sensor forgery, witch attack, replay attack and More categories [27].

4. Physical Attack:

In this attack, the attacker physically accesses the IoT device as an authenticated user. Most static devices are not completely secure in the network, so the attack methods are different, such as mobile device loss attacks, stolen card attacks, Stolen device attacks, USB attacks and similar device attacks[27].

5. Routing Attack:

6. Guessing Attack:

In the cloud computing of the Internet of Things, there is an authentication mechanism that is completed by the authentication server. It has authentication information, such as device ID, user password, and device key. Therefore, the attacker tries to obtain the authentication information from the server, The attacker can extract this information directly from the server, otherwise if the attacker cannot access the server, in this case, he will try to guess the password to authenticate himself as a legitimate user[27].

7. DOS Attack:

DOS (Denial of Service) attacks are a major problem in the Internet world. It is the target of such attacks, by restricting access to machines or services rather than destroying the service itself [30].

8. Sybil attack:

This kind of attack is also called a sybil or fake attack. It is a forgery attack. The attacker pretends to be an authorized party and an ordinary user, but in fact he is not, and uses a forged device to reduce network performance by creating a channel. For network traffic, Therefore, the availability of network services and equipment is affected.

The Sybil attack can occur by a malicious node, which broadcasts data with multiple identities, which will cause the network to be abnormal. It is very important to keep the Internet of Things working here, and prevent it by using strong security defenses [28,31].

In this article, we will show the modification scheme of the basic RC4 algorithm shown in [1]. We propose an authentication scheme based on user cards (such as private and public cards distributed by the authentication server). After the user registers in the server, Then the server sends the user's encrypted private card, each of which contains user information, and saves the user's confidential data, such as key, PIN code, authentication code, public key, and private key, in its own private card. The user's public information, such as the user ID, is stored in the public card. The public key and the user can communicate with their own public cards through the server, and the servers use these cards to send messages. The user himself does not need to return to the server again. In the proposed scheme, we use the symmetric password of the user message and the asymmetric password of the mutual key, user signature and message authentication.

2. The research problem

In this article, we propose a user card-based authentication scheme, and link our proposed scheme with the scheme existing in [1]. In this article, we are looking for two problems with relaying:

1. First problem: The key weakness of basic RC4[1].

2. Second problem: Complex technology for user authentication and secure user messages.

The first problem was solved in research [1], in which the researchers proposed to reduce the bytes in each round to 16 bytes. In addition, they proposed to add a permutation function to change the key after each round of encryption. This feature.

The second question, we propose an authentication scheme based on user cards, in which the server has two functions:

1. The first function, register a user and give her/his user ID, PIN code, and the user's private card contains confidential information, which is used to encrypt user messages using RC4-Pr symmetric and RSA asymmetric encryption.

2. The second function, if the user requests to distribute the user's public card, the user sends his verification code, his own user ID and the receiving user ID to the verification check, and then the server sends the user's public card to the recipient user, so the sender user can then send the message to the recipient user without returning to the server again.

We propose to obtain confidentiality through the use of RC4-Pr and RSA encryption and message authentication, user signatures and the use of RSA encryption, which we will show in the methodology section.

2. Related works

1. Programmatically implementation of basic RC4: The RC4 algorithm is one of the algorithms used to protect data and information, which facilitates the understanding and learning of the algorithm. There have been many previous works that have simulated the working principle of the RC4 algorithm.

In [39], the researchers used the Visual Basic .net 2008 programming language to demonstrate the behavior of the RC4 algorithm and the programming of the code described above, showing the stages of the algorithm in the form of detailed images, showing the input text to be encrypted and the key and convert them to ASCII code, and indicate whether the key is less than 256 bytes, and the key repeats to the required limit. Then we enter the stage of creating a key for encryption, first explain how to create an s-box, then how to use it to configure the key stream, and finally a screen showing the process of encrypting text using XOR and Keystream to get ciphertext.

2. The weakness of basic RC4:

More than 25 years Ron Rivest discover the RC4 stream cipher, all that time it's used widely and was one of the best achievements in the crypto word. For more than 15 years researchers know about the weakness in

RC4 that help the attacker to decrypt the key stream. RC4 is a stream cipher, it Encrypt the plain text by mixing it with a series of random bytes. Making it impossible for anyone to decrypt it without having the same key used to encrypt it. but the bytes use to encrypt the plain text are not really as random as they should be at least at the beginning of the process this is the known weakness in RC4.According to that weakness the RC4 suffer from many attacks during all the previous years we will mention some of them in this paper [40].



Figure 6 RC4 stream cipher

I. How RC4 runs:

Rc4 runs in two phase the first part is key scheduling algorithm KSA which is takes an arrays s or s-boxes to derive a permutation of $\{0,1,2..., N-1\}$ using a variable size key k.

The second part is the output generation part PRGA which prod use pseudo-random bytes using permutation derived from KSA. each loop or round produce one output value .RC4 is used with word length n=8 bits and n=256 [41].

II. Attacks caused by RC4 weakness:

Due to the known weakness of the RC4 algorithm, some researchers have been able to present how the algorithm can be penetrate by the attackers by exploiting the weakness. We mention some attacks below:

Knudsen et al. they attack one version of RC4 with n<8 by their backtracking algorithm in which the adversary guesses the internal state and checks if an anomaly occurs in later stage. In the case of contradiction, the algorithm backtracks through the internal state and reguesses. This remains the only effect algorithm which attempts to discover the secret internal state of this cipher.

A serious weakness in RC4 was observed by Mantin and Shamir who noted that the probability of a zerooutput byte at the second round is twice as large as expected. in broadcast applications a practical cyphertext only attack can exploit this weakness.

A probabilistic correlation between the secret information (s, j) and the public information (I, output) is discovered by Jenkins. On the other hand, Golic detected a positive correlation between the second binary derivative of the least significant bit output sequence and 1. This correlation can be distinguished from the random stream of bits by only 2.7^{44} outputs bytes.

Grosul and Wallach showed that a related key attack works better on a very long keys, another weakness is also discovered by Andrew which is a classis of weak keys on RC4.

Also, if some portion of the secret key is known the RC4 can be broken completely. This is what Fluhrer et al is demonstrate. This is very important discover because in the wired Equivalence privacy protocol (WEP) a fixed secret key is concatenated with IV modifiers for encrypting the messages, this is shown the attach ca be done.

Another weakness was observed recently by Paul and Preneel they designed an algorithm to deduce certain special RC4 states known as (non-fortuitous predictive state). And they proved that only a known elements of the s-box along with two index-pointers cannot more than an output byte in the next random.

Daniel J. Bernstine a professor in university of IIIinoins at Chicago presented his research on secret key cryptosystem discover a new attack on the RC4 that enable the attacker to compromise a victim's session with a site protected by TLS. that's mean attack against TLS/RC4 is possible.

III.A new weakness in RC4:

A new weakness in the RC4 is discovered by the researchers. They observe that the distribution of the first two output bytes not uniform. This makes the RC4 trivial to distinguish between short outputs of rC4 and random string by analyzing their first or second outputs values of RC4 or Diagraph. And they note that the probability that the first two output bytes are equal. Fluhrer and McGrew showed that the first two outputs take the value (0,0). Experiments observed that this result is incorrect. [41.42]

3. The key vulnerability of basic RC4:

A. Mughaid, A. Al-Arjan, et al in [1], are proposing a permutation function that is used to changing the key of every stream 16 bytes encrypted even at the end of plaintext, thus the subkeys count are equal to the count of bytes divided by 16, and adding one to the integer result if remainder, not equal zero, for instance, if we need to encrypt of 321 bytes then, we need ((321/16)+1) is equal to 21 subkeys used to encrypt 321 bytes, we will illustrate this proposed in this section.

i. RC4-Pr modified algorithm:

This paragraph explains what has been modified in the basic algorithm, to avoid any attack that depends on determining the statistical relationships between the encrypted text and the encryption key used to discover either the plaintext or secret key. Furthermore, this modification was made by doubling the cipher key scheduling in each round KSA - 2x, the first scheduling is done to generate the new subkey for a round Encryption, and the second scheduling is used to generate the stream keys to encrypt the data of this round. This process is repeated for each round of encryption to reach the last round. Also, the key length is specified as 128 bits, and the length of the data in the round is also 128 bits [1].

A. Generate subkeys by Pr function:

The Pr function is an importance in the modified

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algorithm to generate all the subkeys used in the key scheduling before the cipher stream begins in each cipher round. Where the encryption key used in this round is sent to the Pr function, that it is transposing bytes to produce a different new subkey and send it to the next round, to complete the encryption process. knowing that the working mechanism of the Pr function is similar to the work of the Key Scheduling Algorithm (KSA), but here the function performs a permutation to arrange the byte in the receiving key to generate a new subkey. Noting that the number of subkeys that canbe generated from the primary encryption key is N factorial. Where N is the length of the key suggested here, 128 bits, the following figure shows how the Pr function works [1]:

S=(0,1,...,n-1), where n is K length. K=(b₀,b₁,...,b_{n-1}), where b's are K bytes. //the following FOR loop is for permutation bytes orders in S by two pointers i, j. For i from 0 to (n-1) j=(j+s(i)+K(i)) mod (n-1) swap(S(i), S(j)) //the following FOR loop is for update permutation bytes orders in K by S. For i from 0 to (n-1) swap(K(i), K(S(i))) //the following code return new round key for current block. Return K

Figure 6 Pr function implementation code

B. RC4-Pr implementation scheme

As previously explained, the difference between the basic algorithm and the modified algorithm is the addition of a function to generate the subkeys, which are used in all rounds of encryption, the following figure shows how the modified algorithm works:



Figure 6 RC4-Pr diagram

4. Methodology of propose model:

i. Programmatic implementation of RC4-Pr-Modified algorithm:

we implemented programmatically the RC4-Pr, which is proposed in [1], by using python language version 3.8, which took 80 programmatically code lines, and we tested encrypt on 7 files and computed some results such as files size, encryption duration time, the number of subkeys used, and the number bytes encryption rate per millisecond, and finally, we computed total results of 7 encrypted files, the following results from python screen as it appeared after execute the program:

The file size: 1779700 Bytes Encryption duration time: 1936.4478588104248 MS The number of subkeys: 111232 Byte's encryption rate: 919.0539223159274 Bytes/MS The file size: 15712007 Bytes Encryption duration time: 19655.32088279724 MS The number of subkeys: 982001 Byte's encryption rate: 799.3767740394147 Bytes/MS The file size: 83987 Bytes Encryption duration time: 19801.0196685791 MS The number of subkeys: 5250 Byte's encryption rate: 4.2415492437125994 Bytes/MS The file size: 366889 Bytes Encryption duration time: 20207.38196372986 MS The number of subkeys: 22931 Byte's encryption rate: 18.156186717236675 Bytes/MS The file size: 25284 Bytes Encryption duration time: 20236.438751220703 MS The number of subkeys: 1581 Byte's encryption rate: 1.249429324538381 Bytes/MS The file size: 1337344 Bytes Encryption duration time: 21921.06032371521 MS The number of subkeys: 83584 Byte's encryption rate: 61.00726790816774 Bytes/MS The file size: 323742 Bytes Encryption duration time: 22307.792901992798 MS The number of subkeys: 20234 Byte's encryption rate: 14.512506971098853 Bytes/MS =======Total Result of encrypt 7 files====== The total files size: 19628953 Bytes The total Encryption duration time: 126065.46235084534 MS The total number of subkeys: 1226813 155.7044461977367 Byte's encryption rate: Bytes/MS Table 2 The results of encrypt 7 files by RC4-Pr

1. RC4-Pr time efficiency:

From the above results, we notice the program needs 126065.4 milliseconds to encrypt 19628953 bytes, which is used 1226813 subkeys at a length of 128-bits for each subkey, and the bytes encryption rate was 155.7 bytes/milliseconds, in another means the program needs 1 minute to encrypt 9 megabytes,

thereby we consider the time efficiency is accepted for encrypting/decrypting authentication messages and user's messages in our proposed.

2. Users' authentication technique model:

In this paper, we proposed an authentication model based on cryptography, and we determined two cryptographic algorithms for use in authentication operations either between the user and server or between the user and another user, as further mention, we will use the RC4-Pr algorithm that proposed in [1], and we will use RSA encryption, and our model divided into two phases:

A. The User registration phase:

In this section, we show the steps of the user registration by connecting with the authentication server and getting the user private card at the end of the registration phase, the following steps show user registration by the authentication server:

Step1: in this step, the novel user connects with the authentication server and requests the registration, in which the server request the novel user to enter a valid email address and mobile number.

Step2: in this step, the novel user will input each of his/her email address and mobile number and send them to the server.

Step3: in this step, the server receives the user email and mobile number without any encryption, and the server will generate unique user-id and PIN-code and encrypts them by its own private key and send it to the received email, and the server sends its own public-key via SMS message to the received mobile number.

Step4: in this step, the user will receive the encrypted authentication message via its own email, and at the same time the user received via SMS the server publickey, and the user will decrypt the message by received public-key and extract user_id, PIN-code, that his/her uses the extracted information to compute its own authentication code.

Step5: in this step, the user computes its own authentication code by the following formula:

Out	-code=h(uid upn uml	umn) 1
Where:		

outh-code: is the user authentication code. h: is a hash function. uid: is the user id. upn: is the user PIN-Code. uml: is the user email address. umn: is the user mobile number.

Step6: in this step, after the user computed its own outh-code in the previous step, in which the user encrypting the user-id and outh-code by using the RC4-Pr algorithm and send the cipher message to the server, the following details show how to create the user secret key and used it for encryption operation:

1. Create user secret key:

K=Md5_h(uid upn) 2

Where:

K: is the user secret key.

Md5_h: is Md5 hash function. uid: is the user id. upn: is the user PIN-Code.

2. Encrypt user authentication message:

To encrypt the user authentication message by RC4-Pr we need a secret key at a length of 128-bits, this illustrates why we used Md5 hash function because the result of the Md5 hash function is a fixed block at the length of 128 bits, thereby we used it as a secret key to RC4-Pr algorithm [1], the following show the encryption line function:

Μ	= (uid outh-code T ₁) 3	
Μ	= M h (M)4	

Where:

M: is the user authentication message. outh-code: is the user authentication code. uid: is the user id. T_1 : is the user current timestamp. h(M): is hash value of **M**.

C=E (M, K) ... 5

Where:

C: is the ciphertext of message.

E: RC4-Pr encryption function.

M: is the user authentication message.

K: is a secret key created by formula 2.

Step7: in this step, the server receives an encrypted authentication message from the user, and computes the secret key by using formula 2 and decrypts the received message using the computed secret key, and extracts the user id, outh-code, T_1 , h(M).

Step8: in this step, the server computes the server current timestamp (T_c), and computes ΔT by using T_c and received T_1 , by using the following formula:

 $\Delta T = T_C - T_1 \dots 6$

Step9: in this step, if the ΔT computed value by formula 6 is less than or equal allowed delay time range, then the server move to check the received message authentication by computing the hash value of the received message after extract the received hash h(M) from the message, and the server compare the computed hash value with the received hash value if they equal then, the server creates the user's private card and encrypts it by RC4-Pr using the user secret key computed by formula 2, and send it to the email address that received from the user.

Step10: in this step, if either the ΔT computed value by formula 6 is greater than the allowed delay time range, or the computed hash value not equal to the received h(M) value then, the server no does any further action and sends a rejection message by email address to the user.

3. The user cards:

1. The Private card:

The user private card is a card that contains the user secret information that her/his uses for connecting either with the server or another user and this information is used to encrypt the sent messages from the user, the following table mention the user private card contents:

Field	Description
User_ID	The user identifier
User_Mobile_Number	The user mobile number.
User_Email	The user email address
Outh_code	The user authentication code
PIN-code	The user PIN-Code, random 6 mixed digits and letters.
S-key	The user secret key
Server-Pub	The public key of the authentication server
Pr-key	The user private key
Pub-key	The user public key

 Table 3 The user private card

2. The Public card:

The user public card is a card that contains the public information of the user, which the user sends to another user for connecting with each, and the exchange public cards are the responsibility of the server after the users received the public card, which they can connect with each other without back to the authenticator server, the following table mentions the user public card contents:

Field	Description
User_ID	The user identifier
User_Name	The user's real name
User_Mobile_Number	The user mobile number.
User_Email	The user email address
Pub-key	The user public key

 Table 4 The user public card

B. The User Logging phase:

In this section, we illustrate the steps that the user needs to login into the system:

i. The User Logging phase steps:

Step1: in this step, the user asks the server to log in to the system by sending the user his user-id.

Step2: In this step, the server searches its black list of users, if the user is in the list, the server rejects this request and sends a rejection message to the user via his/her email.

Step3: in this step, if the user that requests to login does not exist in the block list then, the server request from the user enters the user-id and PIN-code.

Step4: in this step, the user extracts the outh-code from his private card after decrypting it and creates an authentication message (M) by formulas 3 & 4, and encrypted by server public key, and sends it to the server, the following formula shows the user authentication message encryption:

Auth_Msg= (M, pub_key) ... 7

Where:

M: is the user authentication message.

pub_key: The server public key

Step5: in this step, the server received the user encrypted Auth_Msg and decrypting it by using its own private key and extract the user-id, outh-code, T1, h(M), the server computes the server current timestamp (TC) and computes Δ T by using formula 6.

Step6: in this step, if the ΔT computed value by

formula 6 is less than or equal allowed delay time range, then the server moves to check the received message authentication by computing the hash value of the received message after extract the received hash h(M) from the message, and the server compare the computed hash value with the received hash value if they equal then, the server generates OTP-code and send it via user SMS, and requests from the user to enter it.

step7: the server checks OTP-code is equal with saved OTP-code then the user enters to its own dashboard.

step8: if each of ΔT , h(M), and OTP-code have not attained server conditions then, the server no does any further action and sends a rejection message by email address to the user.

ii. Block user account:

The user prevents logging in if only if fails three times to login into the system, which the server adds the user to black list and block user account until, the server sends an email message contains sensitive data about the device that tries to log in, such as, device name, device IP address, Date-Time, and information of Internet service provider for this device, in addition, the server generate activation code and sends it to the origin user via SMS by registered mobile number, in which the server asked from origin user to enter the received code to activate his/her account then, if the user entered correct code then, the server allows to user to log in again.

iii. User dashboard:

After the user login successfully appears user dashboard, which is used for user procedures such as, view his/her private card, sends his/her public card, sends a message to another user, and view the publics cards list that is saved.

1. View user private card:

The user can view his private card after login, that which contains user secret information used in connection operations between the user and others or with the authentication server, especially it used to encrypt/decrypt the received/sent data, the following shows user13 private card after decrypted it by RC4-Pr algorithm by using user secret key that computed by formula 2:

User_Id ====> user13 outh_code ====> 3076315706752804757 pin_code ===> ZTMw9G S_Key ====> 48_102_192_245_224_165_19_50_81_78_15_225_ 56_140_76_105 server_pub_key ====> 21883-5 private_key ====> 75137-31963 public_key ====> 75137-7

Figure 7 User private card 2. Send user public card to another user:

The user can send his public card to another user, in order to connect with him, which is contains the public information of the user, such as, user id, name, mobile number, email address, and the user public key, which the user sends its own user id, recipient user id, and its own the outh_code to the server, the following steps show how to the user can send public card:

step1: the user asked the server to sends his public card to the recipient user.

step2: the server asked the user to send the sender id, the sender outh_code, and the recipient id.

step3: the user creates an encrypted message by the server public key, which the encrypted message is contained the user id, outh_code, and the recipient id, and send it to the server.

step4: the server decrypts the received message by its own private key and extracted each sender id, sender outh_code, and recipient id, in which the server checks of extracted data if it is correct then, the server sends the user public card to the recipient via his email.

step5: if extracted data in step4 is not correct then, the server sends a rejection message to the user via email.3 Sond messages:

3. Send messages:

The user can send a message to another user without connecting with the server to do that, but the sender user must have the public card of the recipient user, because the card contains important information used in sending, such as user id, email address, and public key of the recipient, the following steps show how to the user can send the message to another user:

1. Sending message:

step1: the user decrypts his private card and extracts a secret key (K), and his private key then, the user extracts the email address and the public key from the recipient's public card.

step2: the user computes the hash value h(msg) of the message before encrypting it, and computes the current timestamp (T_1) .

step3: the user creates an authentication detail (**auth-dtls**), which is added to the end of the encrypted message, the following formula shows that:

u-signature=E (user_id||h(msg)||K||T₁, PR_{Sender}) 8 auth-dtl=E (u-signature, Pub_{Recipient})......9

step4: the user computes a secret key for the recipient (K') by using the recipient id and sender secret key that is used to encrypt/decrypt the message, the following formula shows how the user computes K':

K'=h (Recipient-ID || K) ... 10

Step5: the user encrypts the message (msg) by using RC4-Pr by using his secret key (**K**'), by the following formula:

Cmsg=E (msg, K') ... 11

Step6: the user adds auth-dtl that computed by formula 8 & 9 to the end of Cmsg that encrypted by formula 11 as one message and sends it to the recipient email.

2. Receiving message:

step1: the recipient user as an initial procedure separates each of the received encrypted the message into Cmsg that encrypted in formula 10 and auth-block that created by formula 8 & 9.

step2: the recipient user decrypts auth-dtl twice, the first one (D_1) by using its own private key, and the second one (D_2) is decrypted (D_1) by using the sender public key, the following formulas show how to do:

 $D_1 = D$ (auth-dtl, $PR_{Recipient}$) ... 12

$D_2=D(D_1, Pub_{Sender}).....13$

<u>step3</u>: if D_2 is readable format then, the recipient extracts each of sender id, h(msg), K', and T_1 .

step4: the recipient is decrypting extracted Cmsg by using extracted K' and computes the hash value of the decrypted message h'(msg), and compares extracted h(msg) with h'(msg), if they are equal then the message authenticated and it was not altered, otherwise, the recipient sends a rejection message to the sender via email.

4. View public cards list:

The user can view all public cards that are saved, which each card contains the public information of a certain user as mentioned previously in Table 4.

C. Request secret information phase:

In this section, we show how the user can request his own secret information, such as PIN-code, private card, and server public key, furthermore, each user has a different server public key, thus just a certain user can decrypt server message that encrypted by server private key that custom for this user.

1. Request server public key:

The server in the registration phase generates the private and public keys for a novel user, and at the same time generates its own private and public keys for a special connection with this user, which the server has different private and public keys for each user individually, the following steps show how a user can request its own server public key:

step1: the user asked the server to get its own server public key.

step2: the server asked the user to enter his user-id.

step3: the user enters his own user-id and sends it to the server.

step4: the server checks of user-id and send his own server public key via SMS by registered mobile number in the server.

2. Request PIN-code:

2.1. Request resend PIN-code:

The user can be asked the server to resend his PIN code, because the server saved the encrypted authentication message that was sent in the user registration phase via the user email, thus the server resends the message again via the same user email, by the following steps: **step1:** the user asks the server to resend his PIN code.

step2: the server asks the user to enter user-id.

setp3: the user sends his user id to the server, and the server receives it and checks of user id, and resends the encrypted server authentication message via the user email.

step4: the user receives the server message, and decrypts it by the server public key, and gets his PIN code.

2.2. Request change PIN-code:

The user can change his PIN code by asks the server to do that, the following steps show how the user can ask that:

step1: the user asks the server to change his PIN code. **step2:** the server asks the user to sends its own user-id and outh_code.

step3: the user sends its own user-id and outh_code to the server.

step4: the server checks of user-id, and generates a new PIN code of the user, and the server computes a new outh_code by formula 1 and computes a new server authentication message of the user, and the last procedure the server updates the user private card and sends the server authentication message and updated private card to the user by his email.

step5: the user receives the server message by its own email, and decrypts the message by the server public key, and gets a new PIN code, and gets an updated private card.

3. Request private card:

The user can ask the server to resends his private card, which the server asks the user to enter user-id and PIN code for the check then, the server resends the encrypted user private card via email.

4. Request change contact information:

The user can ask the server to change its own email address or mobile number, all the user's messages encrypted by the server public key at all the user steps, by the following steps the user can change that:

step1: the user asks the server to change its own contact information.

step2: the server asks the user to sends user-id and outh_code for checks user-id.

step3: the user enters his own user-id and outh_code, and sends them to the server.

step4: the server checks of user-id, and asks the user to enters her/his email address.

step5: the user enters his own email address and mobile number, and sends them to the server.

step6: in this step, the server will be registered the user again but by the same user-id, thus the server goes to generates its own public and private keys and for the user, and user PIN code and the server will use the same steps in the user registration phase from step3 to step6.

5. The authentication model results:

Our proposed model achieved the highest levels of security, confidentiality, message authentication, digital signature, secure secret key exchange, and prevention of attacks. The following explains all of the above in our research paper:

Result	Description
Confidentiality	When the user at the registration phase sends an encrypted message containing the user_id and outh-code using the RC4-Pr algorithm and the secret key to the server, only the server can decrypt it through the shared secret key. When the server creates the user's private card, then sends it encrypted to the user by the RC4-Pr algorithm and the secret

	key known only to the
	user and the server only
	the user can decrypt this
	message
	message.
	The user-sender used
	RC4-Pr to encrypt his
	message by K' secret key
	and encrypt an
	authentication detail by
	RSA using his private
	key and the recipient's
	public key.
_	the user encrypts
	authentication message
	(uid outh code T1 h
	(M)) by the secret key,
	then is sent to the server,
	here is the only server
	that can decrypt it with
	the shared secret key, the
	server and the user who
	sent the message Only
	those who have the key
	(here check one of the
	authentication
	conditions that the
	message came from the
	alleged party) to make
_	sure of the second
	condition that the
	condition that the
	maaccocco boo mot
	message has not
	changed, from
	changed, from calculating the hash
Message authentication	messagehasnotchanged,fromcalculatingthehashvalue of a message.
Message authentication	messagehasnotchanged,fromcalculatingthevalue of a message.When the user logs into
Message authentication	messagehasnotchanged,fromcalculatingthevalue of a message.When the user logs intothesystem,
Message authentication	messagehasnotchanged,fromcalculatingthehashvalue of a message.When the user logs intothesystem,anauthenticationmessage
Message authentication	messagehasnotchanged,fromcalculatingthehashvalue of a message.When the user logs intothesystem,anauthenticationmessageisgeneratedgenerated
Message authentication	messagehasnotchanged,fromcalculatingthehashvalue of a message.When the user logs intothesystem,authenticationmessageisgeneratedgeneratedfromuseranduserandisencryptedby
Message authentication	messagehasnotchanged,fromcalculatingthevalue of a message.When the user logs intothesystem,authenticationmessageisgeneratedfromtheuser and isencryptedbytheserver'spublickey
Message authentication	messagehasnotchanged,fromcalculatingthevalue of a message.When the user logs intothesystem,anauthenticationmessageisgeneratedgeneratedfromuserandserver'spublickeyandsenttothesenttothesenttothesenttothesenttotototototototototheto
Message authentication	message has not changed, from calculating the hash value of a message. When the user logs into the system, an authentication message is generated from the user and is encrypted by the server's public key and sent to the server, as shown in Equation No
Message authentication	message has not changed, from calculating the hash value of a message. When the user logs into the system, an authentication message is generated from the user and is encrypted by the server's public key and sent to the server, as shown in Equation No. 7 where the server
Message authentication	message has not changed, from calculating the hash value of a message. When the user logs into the system, an authentication message is generated from the user and is encrypted by the server's public key and sent to the server, as shown in Equation No. 7, where the server knows who the sender is
Message authentication	message has not changed, from calculating the hash value of a message. When the user logs into the system, an authentication message is generated from the user and is encrypted by the server's public key and sent to the server, as shown in Equation No. 7, where the server knows who the sender is because at the beginning
Message authentication	message has not changed, from calculating the hash value of a message. When the user logs into the system, an authentication message is generated from the user and is encrypted by the server's public key and sent to the server, as shown in Equation No. 7, where the server knows who the sender is because at the beginning of the user's registration
Message authentication	message has not changed, from calculating the hash value of a message. When the user logs into the system, an authentication message is generated from the user and is encrypted by the server's public key and sent to the server, as shown in Equation No. 7, where the server knows who the sender is because at the beginning of the user's registration,
Message authentication	message has not changed, from calculating the hash value of a message. When the user logs into the system, an authentication message is generated from the user and is encrypted by the server's public key and sent to the server, as shown in Equation No. 7, where the server knows who the sender is because at the beginning of the user's registration, the server generates a
Message authentication	message has not changed, from calculating the hash value of a message. When the user logs into the system, an authentication message is generated from the user and is encrypted by the server's public key and sent to the server, as shown in Equation No. 7, where the server knows who the sender is because at the beginning of the user's registration, the server generates a key Public and private
Message authentication	message has not changed, from calculating the hash value of a message. When the user logs into the system, an authentication message is generated from the user and is encrypted by the server's public key and sent to the server, as shown in Equation No. 7, where the server knows who the sender is because at the beginning of the user's registration, the server generates a key Public and private for each user, and the
Message authentication	message has not changed, from calculating the hash value of a message. When the user logs into the system, an authentication message is generated from the user and is encrypted by the server's public key and sent to the server, as shown in Equation No. 7, where the server knows who the sender is because at the beginning of the user's registration, the server generates a key Public and private for each user, and the server generates a public
Message authentication	message has not changed, from calculating the hash value of a message. When the user logs into the system, an authentication message is generated from the user and is encrypted by the server's public key and sent to the server, as shown in Equation No. 7, where the server knows who the sender is because at the beginning of the user's registration, the server generates a key Public and private for each user, and the server generates a public and private key to
Message authentication	message has not changed, from calculating the hash value of a message. When the user logs into the system, an authentication message is generated from the user and is encrypted by the server's public key and sent to the server, as shown in Equation No. 7, where the server knows who the sender is because at the beginning of the user's registration, the server generates a key Public and private for each user, and the server generates a public and private key to communicate with each
Message authentication	message has not changed, from calculating the hash value of a message. When the user logs into the system, an authentication message is generated from the user and is encrypted by the server's public key and sent to the server, as shown in Equation No. 7, where the server knows who the sender is because at the beginning of the user's registration, the server generates a key Public and private for each user, and the server generates a public and private key to communicate with each user individually, and
Message authentication	message has not changed, from calculating the hash value of a message. When the user logs into the system, an authentication message is generated from the user and is encrypted by the server's public key and sent to the server, as shown in Equation No. 7, where the server knows who the sender is because at the beginning of the user's registration, the server generates a key Public and private for each user, and the server generates a public and private key to communicate with each user individually, and the server is the party
Message authentication	message has not changed, from calculating the hash value of a message. When the user logs into the system, an authentication message is generated from the user and is encrypted by the server's public key and sent to the server, as shown in Equation No. 7, where the server knows who the sender is because at the beginning of the user's registration, the server generates a key Public and private for each user, and the server generates a public and private key to communicate with each user individually, and the server is the party that can decrypt the
Message authentication	message has not changed, from calculating the hash value of a message. When the user logs into the system, an authentication message is generated from the user and is encrypted by the server's public key and sent to the server, as shown in Equation No. 7, where the server knows who the sender is because at the beginning of the user's registration, the server generates a key Public and private for each user, and the server generates a public and private key to communicate with each user individually, and the server is the party that can decrypt the message.
Message authentication	message has not changed, from calculating the hash value of a message. When the user logs into the system, an authentication message is generated from the user and is encrypted by the server's public key and sent to the server, as shown in Equation No. 7, where the server knows who the sender is because at the beginning of the user's registration, the server generates a key Public and private for each user, and the server generates a public and private key to communicate with each user individually, and the server is the party that can decrypt the message. When messages are
Message authentication	message has not changed, from calculating the hash value of a message. When the user logs into the system, an authentication message is generated from the user and is encrypted by the server's public key and sent to the server, as shown in Equation No. 7, where the server knows who the sender is because at the beginning of the user's registration, the server generates a key Public and private for each user, and the server generates a public and private key to communicate with each user individually, and the server is the party that can decrypt the message. When messages are exchanged between two
Message authentication	message has not changed, from calculating the hash value of a message. When the user logs into the system, an authentication message is generated from the user and is encrypted by the server's public key and sent to the server, as shown in Equation No. 7, where the server knows who the sender is because at the beginning of the user's registration, the server generates a key Public and private for each user, and the server generates a public and private key to communicate with each user individually, and the server is the party that can decrypt the message. When messages are exchanged between two users, the sending user

	signature which is a message encrypted with the sender's private key and used as an authentication technique to ensure that the sender does not deny or repudiate a message, which is re-encrypted using the recipient's public key, shown in equations 8 and 9.
Secret Key exchange	The user-sender can exchange a secret key with the recipient by using RSA encryption, which we showed in create authentication detail.
Attacks prevention	If the user fails to log into the system three times, the server will block the user account in anticipation, and then send an email to the original user containing sensitive information about the device that
SEN	tried to access the user account. The recipient of the message can detect if somebody is in the middle by computing delay time ΔT after receiving the message.

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 Table 5 The authentication model results

6. Discussion:

The proposed model achieves many security aspects, such as safe the messages transmitted from passive or active attacks by using symmetric encryption, in which we used RC4-Pr to encrypt these messages, furthermore, we used asymmetric encryption to achieves safe exchanging of secret information by using RSA encryption that to resolve many important issues such as, sender digital signature, data confidentiality, message authentication using the hashing, and secret key exchange, in addition, prevent some of the attacks especially masquerading attacks by using cryptography, hashing, and timestamps, and we used multi-factor authentication by using PIN-code, OTP-code by sending them via email address and SMS of users.

7. Conclusion and Future work:

The purpose of developing authentication technology is to prevent illegal users by finding modern authentication technology that relies on multi-factor authentication, which relies on cryptography during data transmission between network nodes, thus preventing many in-the-middle attacks such as masquerading attacks. User authentication is an important part of system security, users are very interested, so researchers have been seeking to develop it, so we implemented the modified RC4-pr algorithm in [1] to make up for the basic RC4 in the paper. Part. In the second part, we improved the identity verification process by designing a highly efficient and secure identity verification technology, in which we introduced a user card-based identity verification technology. In this technique, the server performs two functions, and the first function goes through three stages (registration, logging, and dashboard). The second function is to distribute the user's public card if the user needs it. These are the two functions mentioned in steps and details in the methodology. In the last comment, we would like to mention that in the future we can further improve user security by adding authorization cards to our models.

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